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ABSTRACT
Seeking advice from knowledgeable individuals within the firm is an essential feature of
firms’ quality control systems and is intended to improve auditor decision making. It is
important to understand factors that encourage or discourage auditors from proactively
seeking out help and relying on the “right” people because advice can influence audit
judgments. Existing studies in accounting focus on factors that affect how auditors use the
advice they obtain during informal consultations. In this study, I examine factors that affect
when auditors seek advice, to whom auditors go for advice, and how they present audit issues
to the advisor, which are likely important determinants of the nature and amount of advice
auditors receive. I predict and find that the social costs involved in seeking advice can
decrease the likelihood that auditors will seek advice and cause them to consult laterally as
opposed to raising issues up the organizational hierarchy. In addition, even when auditors
seek advice and go to the most knowledgeable source, social costs can cause auditors to
argue for their position more persuasively and present a less balanced set of facts to the
advisor than when social costs are low. I find that the internal quality review process can help
overcome otherwise strong social pressures and promote more effective consultations among
auditors. Implications for researchers and practitioners are discussed.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS........................................................................................................ iii
ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................................... iv
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................. vii
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................... viii
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................1
II. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................9
III. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT .......................................................................................11
IV. METHODOLOGY ...........................................................................................................23
V. RESULTS ........................................................................................................................27
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS .................................................................................40
REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................43

v

LIST OF TABLES
TABLE 1 – TESTS OF HYPOTHESES 1 AND 2..........................................................................50
TABLE 2 – TESTS OF HYPOTHESES 3 AND 4 ..........................................................................52
TABLE 3 – TESTS OF HYPOTHESES 5 AND 6..........................................................................54

vi

LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE 1 – CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE ADVICE-SEEKING PROCESS .................................57
FIGURE 2 – LIKELIHOOD OF SEEKING ADVICE .....................................................................58
FIGURE 3 – LIKELIHOOD OF CONSULTING THE MANAGER ....................................................59
FIGURE 4A – PERSUASIVENESS OF COMMUNICATIONS – TOTAL NUMBER OF FACTS .............60
FIGURE 4B – PERSUASIVENESS OF COMMUNICATIONS – BALANCE OF
(NON) SUPPORTING FACTS................................................................................61
FIGURE 4C – PERSUASIVENESS OF COMMUNICATIONS – HOW PERSUASIVE
IS THE MESSAGE ...............................................................................................62

vii

I. INTRODUCTION
Auditors often desire advice from others to supplement their personal experience
or knowledge when faced with difficult judgment tasks. As a result, they frequently
consult with individuals inside the firm, both formally and informally, to obtain advice or
guidance when making difficult decisions (Gibbins and Emby 1985; Danos et al. 1989).1
Seeking advice from knowledgeable individuals within the firm is an essential part of
firms’ quality controls and is intended to improve auditor decision making (Ng and
Shankar 2010; AICPA 2009). According to the AICPA’s Statement on Quality Controls,
accounting firms should ensure that consultations: (1) take place on the appropriate
issues, (2) occur with professionals with the appropriate knowledge, seniority, and
expertise, and (3) all the relevant facts known to the engagement team are provided to
those consulted (AICPA 2009). When these guidelines are met, consultation helps
promote quality and improve professional judgment. I explore how the social costs
involved in seeking advice may prevent these guidelines from being met. I also
investigate how the internal quality review process, which is a within-firm ex-post
inspection process used to monitor audit quality, may aid in promoting more effective
consultations among auditors.
Understanding factors that influence auditors’ informal consulting behavior is
important because in many instances, auditors receive informal advice or guidance only
1

Consistent with Schrah et al. (2006) and Bonaccio and Dalal (2006), I define “advice” as a specific
recommendation or appraisal of facts.
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when they seek it out. Existing studies in accounting focus on factors that affect how
auditors use the information or advice they obtain during informal consultations (Kadous
et al. 2010; Ng and Shankar 2010; Shankar and Ng 2008). Researchers have yet to fully
investigate, however, factors that affect when auditors seek advice, to whom auditors go
for advice, and how they present audit issues to the advisor, which are important
determinants of the nature and type of advice auditors receive.
Conventional wisdom suggests that auditors will always seek advice from the
most experienced/knowledgeable person accessible. However, auditors’ social
motivations to maintain and enhance their ego and image can compete with instrumental
motivations to obtain useful information and make high quality judgments.2 In other
words, the cost of seeking such advice in terms of reputation and ego may influence
whether advice is actually sought. This can have implications on the efficiency of the
audit, if time is wasted. It can also affect the quality of the audit if the auditor avoids
getting the necessary help altogether or from the right person.
I investigate how social costs, defined as threats to the auditor’s ego (particularly
feelings of embarrassment or incompetence) and/or image within the firm, can negatively
influence whether an auditor consults, with whom the auditor chooses to consult, and
how the auditor communicates information to their advisor. If the auditor is more
concerned about embarrassment or others perceiving them as incompetent or incapable
than they are about receiving helpful advice, they may not seek advice from the most
qualified professional (i.e., the one with the most knowledge, seniority, and expertise) in
2

Social motives consist of two dimensions, the self-view and others’ view of the person, and involve the
desire to protect or enhance one’s image and/or ego. Conversely, instrumental motives involve the desire to
obtain useful information, enhance accuracy or performance, and develop competency (Morrison and Bies
1991; Anseel et al. 2007). This study focuses on the desire to enhance judgment performance.
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order to “save face.” Similarly, if the auditor is trying to manage their image or avoid
feeling incompetent, they may present the advisor with information in a biased or
persuasive manner, effectively precluding the advisor from generating an unbiased
opinion.3 In these types of situations, the auditor’s consultation behavior is influenced by
social motives at the expense of improving decision-making.
One structural mechanism in firms that may increase auditors’ instrumental
motivation and mitigate the negative effects of social costs is the internal quality review.
In response to changes in the current regulatory environment, firms have ramped up
internal quality monitoring, which has resulted in increased scrutiny from within-firm
engagement reviews.4 When an internal quality review appears likely, the associated
increase in scrutiny is predicted to shift auditors’ focus away from the social costs
associated with seeking advice towards instrumental motives of making high-quality
judgments. I predict that this affects auditors when deciding whether to seek advice,
when choosing an advisor, and when communicating the issue to the advisor.
Using existing research in accounting, psychology, and organizational behavior,
along with information obtained through interviews with practicing auditors, I develop
predictions regarding the impact of the perceived social costs of seeking advice and the
anticipation of an internal quality review on the auditor’s informal consultation process. I
test these predictions in a 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment, with social costs
manipulated as either high or low and the likelihood that the engagement will be selected
for an internal quality review manipulated as either highly likely or not likely. Practicing
3

This biased presentation of information could be intentional or unintentional. The distinction of
intentionality is not addressed in this paper.
4
While the number of reviews has increased, uncertainty still exists as to whether or not select
engagements will be chosen for review.
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audit seniors from each of the Big 4 firms are given a situation where an audit issue
comes up, and they have to make a decision about whether additional inventory
procedures must be completed. They are provided with facts about the client, the
engagement, and the inventory issue, and are then given the opportunity to consult
another auditor for advice.5 I measure both the likelihood that they will seek advice and
from whom they choose to seek the advice, and I also collect qualitative text responses
representing the communications the participant would have with their chosen advisor.
Consistent with my predictions, I find that auditors are less likely to seek advice
from another auditor when social costs are higher. The effects of social costs are
moderated, however, by the anticipation of an internal quality review. That is, social
costs have less of an effect when an internal quality review is highly likely, making
auditors least likely to seek advice when social costs are high and the engagement is not
likely to be selected for an internal quality review. Even if auditors do seek advice, social
costs and internal quality review factors are influential in determining who the auditors
chose to go to for advice. Results suggest that auditors are more likely to go up the
organizational hierarchy for help as opposed to laterally (e.g., consult the manager versus
a peer) when social costs are lower and also when an internal quality review is likely to
occur. Similar to the tests examining whether they would seek advice in the first place,
auditors are least likely to consult the manager when social costs are high and the
engagement is not likely to be selected for an internal quality review. The threat of an

5

The case was developed with the help of partners, senior managers, and managers from the participating
firms to ensure that it was an issue where the manager on the engagement would want to be consulted on
the issue.
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impending internal quality review increases the likelihood that the manager is consulted
regardless of social costs.
I also find that auditors change the way in which they communicate audit issues to
their advisor based upon the social costs they are facing and the likelihood that they will
encounter an internal quality review. More specifically, auditors differ in the extent to
which they try to persuade the advisor and change the type of facts that they provide.
Auditors facing higher social costs are more persuasive in their techniques, providing
more convincing messages and fewer facts to support alternatives to their position, likely
as a means to reduce the threats to their ego/image. The anticipation of an internal quality
review, with its increase in potential scrutiny and focus on justification of decisions,
affects auditors facing high and low social costs in different ways. Those facing high
social costs become less persuasive in how they communicate their message when an
internal quality review is highly likely, but still present a relatively unbalanced set of
facts to their advisor. Those facing lower social costs actually increase the number of
facts presented to the advisor, especially those supporting alternatives to their position,
while they argue less persuasively in the message to their advisors. Thus in all cases, the
anticipation of an internal quality review seems to promote more effective consultations,
at least in part. An implication of these findings is that firms may be able to alter the
behavior of auditors simply by increasing the perception that they will be subject to an
internal quality review.
I also find that certain demographic characteristics of auditors are important in
determining their advice-seeking behaviors. More specifically, females are more likely to
seek advice than males. Lower performers (i.e., those with lower self-reported
3

performance ratings), who are presumably the ones most in need of help, are the least
likely to seek it. Those with prior PCAOB inspection experience are the most likely to
seek advice and the most likely to go to the manager. Less experienced auditors and those
that are less likely to seek advice are the least likely to consult the manager. And finally,
more confident auditors are more likely to consult the manager.
Taken together, these results have important implications for practice as they shed
light on the importance of the engagement environment in fostering advice-seeking
behaviors. In addition, these results suggest that the threat of an internal quality review
may promote more frequent and more effective consultations by providing auditors the
extra incentive they need to overcome fears of “looking dumb” when asking questions. In
other words, firms may help auditors overcome otherwise strong social pressures by
increasing the belief that engagements will be reviewed. This idea is supported by
supplemental analyses, where I find auditors believe that the internal quality reviews in
their firm are likely to affect decisions made on the engagement, make auditors justify
their decisions more thoroughly, and increase the importance of the reasonableness and
quality of audit judgments.
This study investigates important quality control and professional development
mechanisms within accounting firms: consultations between auditors and internal quality
reviews. Public accounting firms are structured in such a way that employees are either
moving up the ladder or out of the firm (Baker et al. 1988). The learning curve is
exceptionally steep, and auditors are constantly presented with new tasks and challenges.
They must leverage the knowledge and experience of others to complete those tasks
effectively and efficiently, and this dependence on others within the firm makes the
4

consultation process a key aspect for maintaining audit quality. This study advances our
understanding of informal auditor consultations by identifying instances when the
assumptions necessary for this quality control system to operate properly might not hold.
It is important to understand factors that encourage or discourage auditors from
proactively seeking out appropriate help when necessary because of the significant
impact advice can have on audit judgments.
This study contributes to both the accounting literature and the broader adviceseeking literature in psychology.6 I identify key factors that organizational behavior
literature suggests may individually drive consultation behavior and investigate the
interactive effects of these factors in a contextually relevant audit setting. In addition, I
integrate the social and instrumental motives framework (developed in the organizational
behavior literature) with the current advice-seeking literature to provide a new
perspective on the advice-seeking process. The existing advice-seeking literature tends to
focus on what decision makers do once advice is received. I advance this stream of
literature by proposing that the advice-seeking process is much more complicated, often
involving a proactive process initiated by the decision-maker. I consider decision points
in the process that occur prior to advice being received, including factors affecting
decision-makers’ choices regarding when to seek advice, who to go to for advice, and
how to communicate the issue to the advisor. These choices determine the nature and
6

This study differs from research into other types of information-search behavior studied in the accounting
literature (e.g., Kennedy et al. 1997; Cloyd and Spilker 1999; Kadous et al. 2008). Auditor consultations
are interpersonal activities involving a search for another person’s appraisal of a given set of facts relating
to an audit issue. This differs from information search behaviors that do not require the involvement of
another auditor and which involve a search for facts rather than another’s evaluation of the facts. Auditor
consultations also differ from feedback-seeking behaviors due to the nature of the appraisal sought.
Feedback-seeking entails obtaining another person’s appraisal of the seeker’s performance rather than
another person’s evaluation of an unresolved audit issue.

5

amount of the advice received, which are assumed to be fixed starting points in existing
literature. I also examine advice-seeking in a context with strong prescriptions against the
influence of social costs (i.e., quality control standards for consultations), which separates
this particular context from others. This study examines how the ex-post internal quality
review process can affect the judgment and decision-making of auditors during the audit.
With the exception of Stefaniak (2009), which looks at the impact of the anticipation of
internal quality reviews on audit fees, accounting research has left the effects of this type
of quality control system on auditor behavior unexamined.7 I suggest and find that while
such reviews are considered an ex-post evaluation of audit quality and a source of
information for firms’ continued improvement; they also function to proactively promote
audit quality when the anticipation of a review induces auditors to focus on making highquality judgments. I provide evidence of how the anticipation of an internal quality
review alters judgments made during the audit engagement, before the team even knows
there will be a quality review.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II provides a
background of auditor consultations, Section III develops the hypotheses, Section IV
discusses the experimental methods, Section V presents the results, and Section VI offers
conclusions and limitations.

7

Though accounting researchers have investigated peer reviews (e.g., Hilary and Lennox 2005; Lennox
and Pittman 2010; Anantharaman 2012), these reviews differ from internal quality reviews in that they are
conducted by another firm rather than other members within the firm. They are conceptually more similar
to PCAOB inspections.
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II. BACKGROUND – AUDITOR CONSULTATIONS
In practice, auditors consult with a wide range of different parties, both formally
and informally, to get advice and guidance when making difficult decisions (Gibbins and
Emby 1985; Danos et al. 1989). This study focuses on informal consultations. According
to Gibbins and Emby (1985, 209), “… respondents indicated that consultation is very
important to [professional judgment in public accounting], particularly consultation with
peers, superiors and technical advisors, and particularly after knowing what
decision/action is preferred but before acting” (cited from Kadous et al. 2010). In fact,
over 90 percent of the accountants in that survey reported consulting with other
accountants before making decisions (Gibbins and Emby 1985).
Understanding the consultation process and practices of auditors is critical
because consultations among auditors are a key quality control mechanism of the firms
designed to guard against poor judgments (Bedard et al. 2008). Research in psychology
provides empirical support for the assertion that consulting with or seeking advice from
others can improve the quality of decisions made and the confidence in these decisions
(Sniezek and Buckley 1995; Harvey et al. 2000; Yaniv and Kleinberger 2000; Yaniv
2004; Yaniv and Milyavsky 2007).8 Recent studies in accounting also demonstrate the
impact advice can have on auditors’ final judgments (e.g., Shankar and Ng 2008; Ng and

8

The increase in confidence may in some cases be misguided rather than a true indication of an increase in
the quality of the decision (e.g., Sprinkle and Tubbs 1998; Heath and Gonzalez 1995). Additionally, this
increased sense of confidence can be both internal confidence of the decision maker and/or external
confidence of others in the decision (Kennedy et al. 1997).
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Shankar 2010; Kadous et al. 2010). These studies confirm findings in psychology that
suggest factors such as the advisor’s expertise, trust in the advisor, and familiarity with
the advisor determine whether and to what extent advice is used (see Bonaccio and Dalal
2006 for a review).
While the literature in both psychology and accounting identify factors that
impact advice use and demonstrate the importance of advice on judgment outcomes, little
is known about when auditors informally seek advice, who they go to for the advice, and
how they communicate the issue to their chosen advisor. This study attempts to fill this
gap in the literature.

0

III. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
No specific line of literature examines all of the important decision points in the
consultation process used in auditing. However, researchers across many disciplines (e.g.,
accounting, psychology, education, organizational behavior, information science) have
explored different types of interpersonal information-seeking behaviors (e.g., adviceseeking, feedback-seeking, help-seeking, knowledge sourcing). Although each of these
behaviors differs in the type of information being sought, many of the behaviors share
common antecedents. Given the extensive nature of the related literature, I rely on it to
develop a general framework which I then apply to auditor consultations to organize my
review of the relevant literature and develop my hypotheses (see Figure 1).
As depicted in Figure 1, social and instrumental motives facilitate the various
aspects of advice-seeking behavior by impacting the perceived costs and value of seeking
advice. The key decisions that occur in the advice-seeking process include the decision of
whether or not to seek advice, the decisions related to how to seek the advice (e.g., tactic,
source, timing), and the decision of whether or how to use the advice. In this paper, I am
primarily concerned with understanding how changes in social costs (related to social
motives) and the potential for an internal quality review (related to instrumental motives)

0

impact: (1) whether advice is sought, (2) the decisions regarding the source to consult,
and (3) the information provided to that source.9
Whether to Seek Advice
The primary assertion of my study is that the presence and salience of social and
instrumental motives influence whether or not advice is informally sought by auditors.
Social motives involve the desire to protect or enhance one’s image and/or ego, and
instrumental motives involve the desire to obtain useful information, justify decisions,
enhance accuracy or performance, and develop competency (Morrison and Bies 1991;
Anseel et al. 2007).
Social Motives – Social Costs
Auditors are motivated to protect their image and their ego. An auditor’s image or
reputation in the firm is exceedingly important in determining their success with the firm
and the opportunities they are offered. An auditor who is perceived as not performing at
an acceptable level might experience decreased compensation in the form of lower
bonuses, lower quality client opportunities, slowed progression in the promotion process,
and given the up or out nature of public accounting—job loss (e.g., Kaplan and Reckers
1993; Stefaniak and Robertson 2010).10 These highly salient negative professional
repercussions can cause auditors to become self-protective and work hard to manage their
image (Stefaniak and Robertson 2010; Sweeney and Pierce 2006). A long tradition in
9

Although the variables of interest likely influence the use of advice, I do not focus on how participants’
use of advice varies in this study. Additionally, although many factors may influence advice-seeking
behavior, interviews with practicing auditors revealed that social costs were important determinants in
advice-seeking decisions.
10
Existing research has also shown that prior impressions of subordinates can impact how positively their
work is evaluated on the current task and the intensity of the review a preparer must endure (Tan and Jamal
2001; Gibbins and Trotman 2002). The results of these studies suggest that the preparer auditor’s reputation
may affect audit quality by altering reviewer behaviors. In the present study, the impact of individual
auditors’ reputations on their behaviors is considered exclusively from a preparer auditor standpoint.
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psychology suggests that people are also motivated to defend and protect their egos
(Baumeister 1999). This leads to a preference for positive and even overly optimistic
information about the self that helps the individual maintain a favorable self-view (Fiske
2010). Accordingly, people tend to avoid information that damages their self-image
(Ashford and Cummings 1983; Morrison and Cummings 1992; Baumeister 1999).
Social costs bring about threats to the image/reputation and the ego, often due to
embarrassment caused by disclosure of unfavorable information to another party. Due to
the interpersonal nature of seeking help, that very act can entail social costs (Lee 2002).
When auditors seek advice, they take the risk that the person with whom they are
consulting will question their competence and skills, which can be personally
embarrassing from an ego-related view and may also undermine their image in the firm.
That is, seeking another's help may involve admitting dependence and inferiority to that
person, and a lack of competence (Lee 1997, Lee 2002). Thus, when auditors consult
with other auditors in practice, they face serious potential social costs.11
The level of social costs incurred when seeking advice varies depending on the
situation and on the advisor. Social costs are considered higher in situations where the
seeker believes the request for advice will be perceived negatively by the advisor. For
example, as auditors gain experience, they are expected to perform their responsibilities
with increased levels of independence and competence and are evaluated based on such
expectations. If an auditor is expected to know (or even believes they should know) or be
able to find the answer to an issue on their own, the social costs of seeking advice may be
11

This study focuses on the social costs associated with seeking advice. Other potential costs of seeking
advice include time, effort, hours the advice giver may charge to the client, and the potential to receive low
quality advice. These non-social costs, including the quality of the advice will be held constant in this
study.
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high because the auditor is risking that the advisor may conclude that they do not have
the expected knowledge and/or ability. Situations such as this with high social costs can
threaten both the auditor’s image and their ego.
Extant literature in organizational behavior suggests that the degree of social costs
faced by the seeker may determine whether or not advice is sought. The pressure to
appear knowledgeable can heighten the sensitivity of individuals in such a way that they
avoid situations that make them feel unintelligent or appear dependent on others (Lee
2002). Several studies show that in high social cost situations, individuals avoid seeking
the help they need (e.g., Lee 1997, 2002; Ashford and Northcraft 1992; Northcraft and
Ashford 1990; Tuckey et al. 2002). This suggests that in the face of higher social costs,
auditors may also avoid seeking the advice they need from other auditors, even when that
advice is easily accessible. Thus, I hypothesize:
H1: Auditors facing higher social costs will be less likely to seek advice than
auditors facing lower social costs.
The Moderating Influence of Instrumental Motives – Internal Quality Reviews
While social costs are likely to impact whether auditors seek advice, they are not
the only threats auditors must manage. Ultimately, performance matters. If an auditor's
work is scrutinized and is not considered high quality, their attempt to handle the
situation or complete the work on their own will be viewed unfavorably. This emphasis
on performance evokes instrumental motives in the auditor to obtain information,
improve performance, and increase competency. In fact, studies have shown that
information-seeking behaviors are influenced by the importance of the task or knowledge
being sought (Burgess 2005; Morrison and Vancouver 2000; Xu, Tan and Yan 2006;

2

Tuttle and Vandervelde 2007) and the perceived need for the information (Levy et al.
1995; Cross and Borgatti 2000).12
Although virtually unexamined in the accounting literature, internal quality
reviews are one structural quality control mechanism used in firms to increase
instrumental motivations with the goal of improving auditor judgments. In the post-SOX
environment, quality review inspections are both internal (internal quality review) and
external (PCAOB inspections) mechanisms used to promote audit quality (Grunfield
2004; PCAOB 2011). These reviews have increased the emphasis on performance and
are receiving growing attention in practice (due to both their prevalence and importance
in driving audit quality). In response to the current regulatory environment, firms have
ramped up their internal quality monitoring, which has resulted in an increasing number
of within-firm engagement reviews. These reviews are ex-post and are intended to
provide an extra level of scrutiny over auditors’ work, beyond the audit review process,
to help ensure both diligence and quality in auditors’ work products (Grunfield 2004;
PCAOB 2011). An internal quality review typically involves a team of managers or
senior managers in the firm (but not on the engagement) performing detailed
reviews/evaluations of the completed audit work to highlight issues or trends that need
attention (Audit Quality Review Board 2007; Stefaniak 2009). Although firms avoid
12

In accounting, studies of both formal and informal consultations demonstrate that the propensity to
consult is positively associated with factors that increase instrumental motivations to obtain information
and improve performance. For example, formal consultations with experts are positively associated with
the level of fraud risk (Hammersley et al. 2011; Asare and Wright 2004; Gold et al. 2012), explicit
requirements to consult (Gold et al. 2012), and deadline pressure (Gold et al. 2012). In informal settings,
Tuttle and Vandervelde (2007) examine posts to an audit listserv and find that the underlying complexity,
client attention, importance, and risk associated with the posting influences the amount of assistance
auditors seek on the listserv. Similarly, Davis and Tuttle (2012) study management accountants’ behaviors
when encountering software exceptions. They find help-seeking behavior is influenced by confidence in
their ability to successfully resolve the issue, or the need for information.
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publishing lists of which engagements will be chosen for an internal quality review, a
survey of 125 partners indicates that the majority of them anticipate whether or not their
audit(s) will be selected (Stefaniak and Houston 2009).
If an internal quality review is likely to occur, the auditors' work on that
engagement is more likely to undergo heavy scrutiny by the internal quality reviewer. As
a result, the normal review process will also likely increase in intensity because the
results of internal quality reviews are often tied to the compensation and evaluation of
managers, senior managers, and partners. Adding more intense within-engagement
scrutiny and an additional layer of review increases the chance of the discovery of poor
judgment and the likelihood of negative consequences for the individual. This increases
the importance of and the need for the best information.13 With an increase in importance
and need, the value of seeking advice is highlighted, increasing instrumental motives to
seek the advice (Ashford & Cummings 1983; Morrison 2002).
As a result, I predict that auditors anticipating an internal quality review will
increase instrumental motivation, causing the auditor to shift weight towards the benefits
of seeking the advice. As predicted in H1, without the anticipation of an internal quality
review, auditors facing higher social costs are expected to shift weight towards the costs
of seeking advice, motivating them to avoid seeking help. When an internal quality
review is anticipated and auditors focus more on the benefits of seeking advice, social
motives are expected to affect advice-seeking less. This means that the anticipation of an

13

This is consistent with the accountability literature. The added level of scrutiny may cause auditors to
feel more accountable for their work and strengthen the need to justify their decisions and/or thought
processes (Kennedy 1993; Koonce et al. 1995). The accountability literature generally demonstrates that
auditors experience increased accuracy motivations and increase their level of effort when they feel
accountable (see Bagley 2010 for a review).
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internal quality review is expected to mitigate, at least in part, the negative effects of
social costs. Thus, because auditors facing lower social costs are already expected to seek
advice more often (H1), those facing higher social costs will be impacted more by the
threat of an internal quality review. Refer to Figure 2 for a graphical illustration of the
prediction. Formally, I hypothesize:
H2: The effects of social costs on the likelihood of seeking advice will be
moderated by the perceived likelihood that an internal quality review will
occur. Specifically, the effect of social costs will be smaller (larger) when and
internal quality review is highly (not) likely.
From Whom to Seek Advice
Just as social and instrumental motives influence the decision of whether or not to
seek advice, they also likely influence who one chooses to seek advice from (assuming
one chooses to seek advice). An auditor is only able to consult with individuals who are
accessible to them, and there are costs and benefits associated with different potential
advisors. Although theory applies to auditors at all experience levels, the present study
examines senior auditors’ consultation practices. Two common sources of advice for
seniors are the manager on the engagement and other auditors in their peer class. The
costs associated with seeking advice from these two sources differ as do the perceived
benefits. Of particular interest to this study is the conflict between the social costs created
by the power-distance differences when comparing the potential sources (i.e., the
manager/supervisor and a peer level auditor) and the assumed accuracy benefits
associated with each source.14

14

The differences in accuracy benefits are assumed as the manager should have more knowledge and
expertise than a peer due to their experience. However it is possible that the peer may give equally accurate
advice.
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Social Motives – Social Costs
Social motives likely influence which costs/benefits are most salient in consulting
the manager on the engagement versus a peer. Many organizational behavior studies have
found that the expertise and the quality of the knowledge received from the source are
important drivers in choosing a source as individuals wish to obtain the most accurate and
useful information possible (e.g., Vancouver and Morrison 1995; Cross and Borgatti
2000; Morrison and Vancouver 2000; Borgatti and Cross 2003). Auditors surveyed by
Danos et al. (1989) also report seeking advice in a hierarchical nature. Yet when faced
with conflicting concerns, the usefulness and accuracy of the information is not always
worth the costs of asking for the information (Vancouver and Morrison 1995), especially
when individuals feel compelled to manage their image with powerful others (Morrison
and Bies 1991).
As the power-distance between the advisee and the advisor increases, so do the
potential social costs (Lee 2002). Managers hold a higher status than the preparer auditor
and control the evaluation the auditor receives at the end of the engagement. Image
concerns are more salient when the seeker is dependent on the source for future
evaluations, opportunities, and rewards (Morrison and Bies 1991; Morrison 2002). As a
result, the characteristics of the manager are important in determining the level of
perceived social costs involved in consulting with them. If the auditor chooses to seek
advice, but feels pressure to either manage their image and/or preserve their ego, then
they are more likely to seek advice from an equal-status peer whose opinion is less
imperative to their future success with the firm (Lee 1997). Seeking advice from a peer
involves a potential tradeoff between the quality of the advice received and the social cost
6

incurred to receive it. Thus, even though auditors would prefer to consult with the
manager to get more useful and accurate advice, they may be less likely to go to the
manager when the social costs of doing so are high. In other words, the results of studies
cited in other domains above suggest that auditors may not always consult with the
person they believe has the most expertise or provides the highest quality advice because
of the high social costs involved. Thus, I hypothesize:
H3: Auditors facing higher social costs will be less likely to seek advice from
the manager than auditors facing lower social costs.
The Moderating Influence of Instrumental Motives – Internal quality reviews
Instrumental motives can also influence the source from which an individual
seeks the desired information (Anseel et al. 2007). As noted previously, the anticipation
of a quality review is likely to increase the auditor’s motivation to make accurate and
defensible judgments. This, in turn, is expected to increase the importance of source
expertise when choosing an advisor. As the expertise or credibility of the source
increases, the instrumental value of their input also increases, which leads individuals to
seek advice from that source more often (Fedor et al. 1992; Levy et al. 2002; Vancouver
and Morrison 1995). Thus, if an auditor has strong instrumental motivation, then he is
more likely to turn to a supervisor for guidance, whereas an auditor with lower
instrumental motivation may be willing to ask a less socially costly peer for advice
(Vancouver and Morrison 1995).
Taken together, the discussions of social and instrumental motives driving the
decision of source suggest an interaction between the level of social costs encountered
and the likelihood that an internal quality review is conducted. In the absence of an
internal quality review, source selection is expected to shift from the manager to a peer as
7

social motives increase (H3) and auditors focus on the costs of consulting the manager.
When an internal quality review is anticipated, however, instrumental motives are
expected to mitigate the negative effects of social costs by shifting auditors’ focus to the
benefits of seeking advice from the manager. Thus, because auditors facing lower social
costs are already expected to consult the manager more often (H3), those facing higher
social costs will be impacted more by the threat of an internal quality review. Refer to
Figure 3 for a graphical illustration of the prediction. Formally, I hypothesize:
H4: The effects of social costs on the likelihood of consulting the manager
(peer) will be moderated by the perceived likelihood that an internal quality
review will occur. Specifically, the effect of social costs will be smaller
(larger) when and internal quality review is highly (not) likely.
Tactics
Once the auditor chooses their advisor, they must provide information about the
issue to the advisor. When an advisor has limited information about the issue in question,
they often rely on the information provided by the advisee as the basis for the
recommendations they make. In audit settings, this is often the case for both formal and
informal consultations. The auditor seeking advice has the most control over the extent
and manner in which information is made available to the advisor. Receiving all relevant
information regarding the issue, however, is essential for the advisor to provide an
informed recommendation (Jonas and Frey 2003). Thus, the information provided to the
advisor is a key determinant of the quality of the advice received and the ultimate
outcome or final decision (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006).
In light of the potential social costs of seeking advice, an auditor may minimize
the appearance of incompetence by framing information in a way that demonstrates an
ability to provide thoughtful solutions to problems encountered. According to Jellison
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and Arkin’s (1997) work on self-presentation theory, arguing for a particular position
“tends to convey the impression that they are knowledgeable, authoritative, expert, and
well-informed.” Thus, regardless of the advisee’s actual confidence in one option over
another, presenting the advisor with facts supporting a position (i.e., persuasive facts)
rather than presenting facts absent a clear conclusion may increase the advisor's
perception of advisee competence, reducing image threats. It may also increase the
chances of consensus when the position is compelling and the advisor is unaware of
relevant facts that may refute the position presented. This likelihood of agreement is also
important when considering social motives because agreement bolsters the ego and can
also stimulate liking between the parties, which enhances the relationship and further
reduces image threats (Fiske 2010).
Because the persuasive communication of facts can boost the advisor's confidence
in, and the perceived competence of the auditor, I expect that auditors are more likely to
present a persuasive set of facts to their advisor when perceived social costs are high.15
Formally, I predict:
H5: Auditors are more (less) likely to present persuasive facts when social
costs are high (low).
The anticipation of an internal quality review, however, may either increase or
decrease the persuasiveness of auditors’ communications to their advisors. Auditors
seeking the most informed advice should be more likely to provide all facts about the
case to their advisor, not just facts supporting the conclusion they have drawn. Because
15

Though the literature suggests auditors will be more persuasive when faced with high social costs, there
is some support for alternative reactions. If an individual wants to obtain the most informed advice
possible, he may present all available facts in order to allow the advisor to determine which facts are
pertinent and increase the quality of the advice received (Jonas and Frey 2003). It is also possible that the
auditor could avoid picking a position for fear that the advisor will not agree.
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internal quality reviews are a deep dive into the audit file to see how the decisions were
made, the potential benefits of presenting persuasive facts to the advisor (e.g., increased
perceptions of competence) may not be realized under the increased scrutiny of an
internal quality review. In addition, like PCAOB inspections, internal quality reviews call
for the auditor to specifically consider both confirming and disconfirming evidence. As
such, the anticipation of an internal quality review should decrease the persuasiveness of
the auditor’s communications when they are otherwise inclined to be overly persuasive
due to high social costs.
However, the ability to justify your process and decisions becomes an important
part in defending against quality review comments, and requiring auditors to document
their judgments prompts them to choose their words carefully in order to achieve their
objectives (Rich et al. 1997; Piercey 2009). According to Arkin (1981, pg. 315), “a claim
to knowledgeability concerning some matter may be undermined by expression of a
cautious or neutral attitude or by an inability to defend one’s judgment persuasively.” As
such, I predict that auditors will focus more on defending their decisions when facing low
social costs and an impending quality review, causing auditors to provide their advisor
with more persuasive evidence than they would when an internal quality review is less
likely to occur. Thus, I predict that the anticipation of an internal quality review will
decrease the persuasiveness of auditors facing high social costs, but increase the
persuasiveness of auditors facing low social costs. Formally, I hypothesize:
H6: An impending internal quality review will make auditors facing high
(low) social costs communicate a less (more) persuasive message.
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IV. METHODOLOGY
Design
In order to examine how social costs and the anticipation of an internal quality
review impact auditors’ advice-seeking behavior, I conducted a 2 x 2 betweensubjects experiment that varied the level of social costs (high, low) and the likelihood
that the engagement would be selected for an internal quality review (highly likely,
not likely). Social costs were manipulated through the description of the audit
environment. The description provided to participants was as follows: “You had
limited interactions with the audit team manager on this engagement prior to Nelcore.
He is considered to be highly competent, and is known for making his team members
feel inferior and incompetent [valued and competent] when they ask him questions.
He will be writing your evaluation.” The likelihood of the engagement being selected
for an internal quality review was manipulated as follows: “The team feels that
Nelcore, Inc. is highly likely [NOT likely] to be selected this year for an internal
quality review.”
The dependent variables of interest are the likelihood of seeking advice (H1 and
H2), the type of advisor chosen (H3 and H4), and the persuasiveness of the message
communicated to the advisor (H5 and H6). The likelihood of seeking advice was
measured using an 11-point scale anchored at “Very Unlikely” and “Very Likely.” The
type of advisor chosen was the participants’ indication as to whether they were more
11

likely to seek advice from the manager on the engagement or from a peer that was
previously a member of the Nelcore engagement team.16 This was measured using a scale
containing the following points, “Definitely a peer who used to be on Nelcore,”
“Probably a peer who used to be on Nelcore,” “Equally likely to go to each,” “Probably
the manager on the engagement,” and “Definitely the manager on the engagement.” The
persuasiveness of the message communicated to the advisor was assessed using three
measures: (1) the total number of facts presented to the advisor, (2) the ratio of facts that
support the participant’s preliminary decision to those that oppose that decision relative
to the total number of facts, and (3) a subjective assessment of the overall persuasiveness
of the message delivered to the advisor.
Participants
One hundred eighteen practicing audit seniors from the Big 4 firms participated in
the study. One of the participating firms declined to provide certain demographic
information, thus the following information excludes this firm.17 Participants had an
average (median) of 4.0 (3.9) years experience, with experience ranging from 2.6 to 8.5
years. Although I expect auditors at all levels to be influenced by social costs and internal
quality reviews, participants of this experience range were chosen because I anticipated
that both social motivations and instrumental motivations are very strong for this group.
Of those reporting demographic information, 56 percent were male, and 44 percent were
female. Ninety percent of participants had performed testing over inventory accounts
16

During a pretest, participants were also presented with the option of seeking advice from their firmassigned “coach” or mentor or a technical specialist. However, as no participants selected these choices in
the pretest, these options were not presented to the full sample of participants.
17
Also, note that where theory and/or extant literature suggest that these demographic variables are
important to include in the analysis, that firm is excluded from the analysis, although the same conclusions
are ultimately reached with all four firms.
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before, and 97 percent had participated in determining which tests to perform on their
engagements. Taken together, this information suggests that the participants were well
suited to complete the task included in the experimental materials.
Task
Participants were provided with instructions and asked to assume the role of lead
senior on the 12/31 year-end Nelcore, Inc. audit engagement.18 They received
information based on an actual audit issue. The issue was described as follows:
“The Nelcore team has completed fieldwork and you are wrapping up your
review of the workpapers from the office. Your manager on the engagement is
balancing multiple engagements and is onsite at another client (not in the office
with the Nelcore team). In discussions with the manager, you have noted that
your review is nearly complete and you don’t expect any issues in the final
stage.
After the meeting with the manager, you identify an inconsistency in the audit
workpapers. The inventory listing used to select locations for inventory
observation does not tie to the inventory balance. As a result, approximately
$1.9 million of inventory was located in another warehouse recently purchased
by the company and was not directly observed by your staff on the balance
sheet date.”
Additional general information about the engagement (e.g., materiality threshold
of $8.5 million, frequency of audit adjustments, assessments of management, etc.) and
information about inventory (e.g., the total balance of $10.0 million, testing performed,
controls reliance, etc.) were both provided. The participant’s ultimate task was to
determine whether additional procedures were necessary or whether sufficient procedures

18

The issue was based on a real audit issue that was described during a focus group conducted with a small
engagement team consisting of a staff, senior, and manager. Then the specific case facts were altered with
the assistance of a partner, two senior managers, and two managers from two of the participating firms to
ensure that it is an issue they would want to know about as the manager, but one that is not so salient that it
would unquestionably be detected in the review process. The materials were refined using information
gathered during a pretest with 19 practicing auditors (largely from the target population although some
pretest participants were more experienced) and five PhD students that were former auditors.
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had been performed over inventory. In anticipation of this decision, they were asked the
likelihood that they would seek advice on the issue from another auditor (dependent
variable for H1 and H2) and asked to provide their preliminary decision on the issue.
Participants then chose an advisor (dependent variable for H3 and H4). They were
given the opportunity to obtain advice from one of two potential advisors: 1) the manager
on the engagement, or 2) a peer who used to be on Nelcore. In order to obtain the advice,
participants were asked to construct an email message to provide to the advisor
(dependent variable for H5 and H6), explaining the situation and requesting the advice.19
The participants were also asked manipulation check questions, the difficulty of the task,
perceptions of internal quality reviews, and demographic questions.

19

Although I am only concerned with auditor behavior prior to receiving the recommendation from the
advisor in this paper, I provide participants with advice and have them make a final decision (following my
dependent measures, but before the manipulation checks and demographic questions) to allow closure for
them on the task. This was suggested by multiple firm representatives. The actual advice provided, which
suggested that additional procedures should be performed and was developed with the help of practicing
auditors, is held constant regardless of the advisor the participant chooses and regardless of the contents of
the message submitted to the advisor. After receiving the information from their advisor, participants are
instructed to reach a final decision.
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V. RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
Participants responded to a manipulation check, structured as a multiple choice
question, for each of the independent variables. For the social cost manipulation check,
participants were provided with two choices, (1) the engagement manager is known for
making his team members feel inferior and incompetent when they ask him questions,
and (2) the engagement manager is known for making his team members feel valued and
competent when they ask him questions. For the social cost manipulation, six individuals
failed the manipulation check and one did not provide an answer to the question. Thus,
94% of participants correctly answered the manipulation check question. Related to this
manipulation, participants were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with six
statements that were intended to assess the amount of social costs they felt were
associated with both the manager and the peer. These statements were adapted using Lee
(2002) as a guide and represent dimensions of social costs related to both the ego and
reputation. Each statement began with the phrase, “If I ask the manager [peer] on
Nelcore for help,” and ended with one of the following phrases, “I will feel
embarrassed,” “he may think I’m NOT competent,” and “he may hold it against me.” As
expected, there were no differences between groups in participants’ assessments of the
social costs associated with the peer (all p values > .30), but those in the high social cost
conditions assessed the social costs associated with the manager to be higher than those
in the low social cost conditions for all three measures: embarrassment, competence, and
15

reputation, (all p values < .001). This suggests that the manipulation was successful in
inducing a feeling that there are higher social costs involved in the high social cost
conditions. Excluding those that failed the manipulation check does not alter the
significance of the results or inferences drawn from the analyses, therefore, all
participants are included in the analyses.
For the internal quality review manipulation check, participants were provided
with two choices, (1) the team feels that Nelcore is highly likely to be selected this year
for an internal quality review, and (2) the team feels that Nelcore is NOT likely to be
selected this year for an internal quality review. For the internal quality review
manipulation, two individuals failed the manipulation check. Thus, 98% of participants
correctly answered the manipulation check question. Excluding those that failed the
manipulation check does not alter the significance of the results or inferences drawn from
the analyses, therefore, all participants are included in the analyses that follow.
Tests of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 make predictions regarding the likelihood that
auditors will seek advice when faced with an audit issue. As the results of studies in
organizational behavior indicate certain demographic variables may be significant in
determining the likelihood of seeking advice, the analyses to test these hypotheses are
performed using all auditors that provided the necessary demographic information. Table
1 Panels A provides information on the likelihood that the participants would seek advice
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on the issue described in the task materials. The information includes the means used to
test the hypotheses, standard deviations, and number of participants in each cell.20
Hypothesis 1 predicts that auditors facing high social costs will seek advice less
than auditors facing low social costs. The mean likelihood of seeking advice in the low
social cost condition is 9.44, and it is 8.75 in the high social cost condition. In Table 1
Panel B, ANCOVA results demonstrate that the level of social costs are significant
predictors of auditors’ likelihood of seeking advice (F-statistic = 9.22, p-value = .002,
one-tailed). Thus, I find support for Hypothesis 1, and conclude that auditors are less
likely to seek advice from another auditor when social costs of seeking advice are high.
As expected, the results of the analysis also confirm the importance of certain
demographic variables, including gender, the participant’s self-assessed performance
rank relative to their peers, and prior inspection experience with the PCAOB.21 Including
these covariates in the ANCOVA significantly improves the model and the amount of
variance explained.22
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the effects of social costs on the likelihood of seeking
advice will be moderated by the perceived likelihood that an internal quality review will
occur. Specifically, it predicts that the effect of social costs will be smaller (larger) when

20

Of the 94 participants, 45 (48%) indicated that they were very likely to seek advice (e.g., they answered a
10 on the scale of how likely they were to seek advice from another auditor). Of these 45 participants, 12
were in the low social cost/low internal quality review condition, 15 were in the low social cost/high
internal quality review condition, 12 were in the high social cost/high internal quality review condition, and
only 6 were in the high social cost/low internal quality review condition.
21
I also find that the audit firm is a significant covariate, although the results of the analysis and inferences
drawn do not change based on whether or not firm is included. This is not unexpected as each firm has a
unique culture and quality control system.
22
It is important to note that responses to the dependent variables did not differ between the firm that
declined to provide demographic information and the others. As such, it is reasonable to assume that the
results of the analyses presented using the limited or representative sample would be similar if the
additional information were available.
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and internal quality review is highly (not) likely. This prediction, coupled with the main
effect prediction of Hypothesis 1, suggests a specific pattern of cell means. Visual
inspection of the graph of cell means depicted in Figure 2 demonstrates the pattern
predicted. As such, I use a contrast as the primary test of the hypothesis (Buckless and
Ravenscroft 1990). To test whether social costs have an effect on the likelihood of
seeking advice (H1), but have a smaller effect when an internal quality review is highly
likely (H2), I use a contrast code of -5, 1, 2, 2 for the high social cost/low internal quality
review, high social cost/high internal quality review, and the remaining conditions,
respectively.
Table 1 Panel C shows tests of the pattern of cell means predicted, and the
contrast is significant (t-statistic = 2.415, p-value = 0.011, one-tailed). Thus, I find
support for Hypothesis 2 and conclude that although auditors are less likely to seek
advice when social costs are high, the threat of an internal quality review helps increase
the likelihood that they will seek advice. 23 Consequently, auditors are least likely to seek
advice when social costs are high and an impending quality review is unlikely, and they
are most likely to seek advice when social costs are low and an impending quality review
is highly likely.
Tests of Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 make predictions regarding the advisor that
auditors will choose when seeking advice on an audit issue. Table 2 Panel A provides
information on the likelihood that the participants would consult with the manager, as

23

A rank ANCOVA and planned contrast were performed on the full sample to correct for violations in
normality and homogeneity assumptions. Results of this analysis (untabulated) demonstrate the pattern
predicted, providing further support for Hypotheses 1 and 2.
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opposed to the peer, on the issue described in the task materials. The information includes
the means used to test the hypotheses, standard deviations, and number of participants in
each cell.24
Hypothesis 3 predicts that auditors facing high social costs will be less likely to
seek advice from the manager than auditors facing low social costs. The mean likelihood
of consulting the manager in the low social cost condition was 9.83 and it was 8.63 in the
high social cost condition. In Table 2 Panel B, ANCOVA results demonstrate that the
level of social costs are significant predictors of auditors’ likelihood of consulting the
manager (F-statistic = 5.71, p-value = .010, one-tailed).25 These results provide support
for Hypothesis 3 and indicate that even when auditors do seek advice on an issue, they
are less likely to go to the manager when social costs are high.
As expected, the results of the analysis confirm the importance of certain
demographic variables, including gender and experience.26 Including these covariates in
the ANCOVA significantly improves the model and the amount of variance explained.27
Hypothesis 4 predicts the effects of social costs on the likelihood of consulting the
manager (peer) will be moderated by the perceived likelihood that an internal quality
24

Of the 118 participants that took part in the study, 13 (11%) indicated they were more likely to consult
with the peer rather than the manager. Of these 13 participants, eight were in the high social cost/low
internal quality review condition, four were in the high social cost/high internal quality review condition,
one was in the low social cost/low internal quality review, and none were in the low social cost/high
internal quality review condition.
25
I include in the analysis the likelihood that auditors would seek advice and their confidence in making the
decision about the inventory issue, as these were found to be significant predictors of the likelihood of
consulting with the manager. When these factors are not included, the internal quality review factor
becomes more significant (p-value = .053); otherwise, the results and inferences are unchanged.
26
I also include the likelihood of seeking advice as a covariate as participants were asked which source
they would select as an advisor regardless of the likelihood they would seek advice. Results suggest that
those who were less likely to seek advice were also less likely to choose to consult the manager.
27
It is important to note that responses to the dependent variables did not differ between the firm that
declined to provide demographic information and the others. As such, it is reasonable to assume that the
results of the analyses presented using the limited or representative sample would be similar in the full
sample (all four firms) if the additional information were available.
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review will occur. Specifically, it predicts that the effect of social costs will be smaller
(larger) when an internal quality review is highly (not) likely. This prediction, coupled
with the main effect prediction of Hypothesis 3, suggests a specific pattern of cell means.
Visual inspection of the graph of cell means depicted in Figure 3, coupled with the
insignificant interaction variable in the ANCOVA (F-statistic = .019, p-value = .445, onetailed) model indicates that the pattern predicted is not present. Instead, I find a main
effect for internal quality review. The mean likelihood of consulting the manager when
an internal quality review is highly likely to occur (9.85) is statistically higher than when
an internal quality review was not likely to occur (8.61) (F-statistic = 6.56, p-value =
.006, one-tailed).28 Thus, regardless of social costs, the threat of an internal quality
review helps increase the likelihood that they will consult the manager. An important
implication of these findings is that even when auditors choose to get help, they may not
choose the most appropriate advisor when perceived social costs associated with seeking
the advice are high. However, the anticipation of an internal quality review can increase
the likelihood of consulting the manager regardless of social costs. This demonstrates the
importance of the audit environment on auditor’s decisions to seek help and provides
insight into one reason auditors may spin their wheels instead of getting help.
Tests of Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6
Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6 make predictions regarding the communications
the auditor makes to their chosen advisor. As there is no reason to believe based on the
results of prior studies that the demographic variables will be significant in determining

28

A logistic regression was performed (untabulated) dichotomizing responses to dependent measure based
on whether they were more likely to consult the manager or peer. This alternative test achieves similar
significance and supports all inferences drawn from the ANCOVA.
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the persuasiveness of communications, the analyses to test these hypotheses are
performed using all auditors and additional analyses confirm that no demographic
variables are significant covariates. In order to analyze the text responses used to test
these hypotheses, two procedures were performed. The first procedure was to separate the
facts contained in each message into those that supported the participant’s position of
whether or not to perform procedures and those that supported alternatives to the
participant’s position on the matter. From this procedure, the total number of facts
(TOTAL FACTS) and the ratio of supporting to non-supporting facts relative to the total
(TYPE OF FACTS) were determined. The second procedure was a subjective assessment
of the overall persuasiveness of the message communicated to the advisor based on how
compelling or convincing it would be as a result of the facts presented and arguments
made (CONVINCING). This procedure was performed by the author and also by a
practitioner that was a practicing senior manager in one of the participating firms.29 A file
containing all of the text responses assigned a unique identifier and in random order was
used for this assessment in order to ensure objectivity. As the inter-rater correlation was
.886 (p-value < .001), the assessments are considered highly similar between coders and
the measure of CONVINCING is an average of the two assessments.
The average (median) length of the text responses is 160 (146) words with the
shortest message containing 31 words and the longest message containing 339 words.
Word count does not vary by experimental condition (all p-values > .500). In addition,
although the word count for those consulting with a peer is slightly higher than those
consulting with the manager (average word count was 183 versus 157, respectively), this
29

This senior manager did not participate in the actual experiment.
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difference is not statistically significant (f-statistic = 1.520; p-value = .220, two-tailed).
Table 3 Panels A, B, and C provide descriptive information on the three measures used to
assess the persuasiveness of the communications from the participants to their chosen
advisors (i.e., TOTAL FACTS, TYPE OF FACTS, and CONVINCING), including the
means used to test the hypotheses, standard deviations, and number of participants in
each cell.30 On average, participants provide 6.63 TOTAL FACTS, with a ratio of .310
TYPE OF FACTS (calculated as supporting facts minus non-supporting facts, divided by
total facts), and a rating of 3.92 out of 10 for how CONVINCING the message is.
Hypothesis 5 predicts that auditors are more (less) likely to communicate a
persuasive message when social costs are high (low). Table 3 Panels D, E, and F provide
ANCOVA results for each of the three measures. Although the average number of
TOTAL FACTS in the high (low) social cost conditions are in the direction predicted at
6.98 and 6.28, respectively, this difference is not statistically significant (F-statistic =
1.23, p-value = .135, one-tailed). Similar results are obtained for the measure of the ratio
of TYPE OF FACTS (supporting versus non-supporting). The average ratio in the high
(low) social cost condition are in the direction predicted at .35 and .27, respectively, but
this difference is not statistically significant (F-statistic = 1.12, p-value = .146, onetailed).31 Analysis of the messages communicated to advisors from a linguistic

30

The extant literature has not found any of the demographic variables measured in this study to be
significant predictors of persuasion; and results of analyses including the three firms that provide all
information confirm such variables are not significant predictors of persuasion. As such, all four firms were
included in these analyses.
31
I include in the analysis the format that the experimental materials were completed in, either online or on
paper, for the analyses of TOTAL FACTS and TYPE OF FACTS because participants were expected to
include more facts when they were able to copy and paste case information as opposed to hand write the
information. As expected, this covariate was at least marginally significant in the expected direction.
There was no predicted relationship between format and persuasiveness, and it was not found to be a
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perspective, on the other hand, shows that auditors present messages that are significantly
more convincing when social costs are high than when social costs are low. Results of
the ANCOVA in Table 3 Panel F demonstrate a significant main effect of social costs as
described (F-statistic = 3.97, p-value = .024, one-tailed). These results provide support
for partial Hypothesis 5 and suggest that even when auditors do seek advice on an issue,
social costs prompt them to argue more persuasively for the position they take on the
issue. Interestingly, the auditors alter the way they deliver the message more so than the
type and amount of facts they provide. An important implication of these findings is that
even when auditors choose to get help and choose the most appropriate advisor, they may
present unbalanced and persuasive facts to the advisor when perceived social costs
associated with seeking the advice are high.
Hypothesis 6 predicts the effects of social costs on the persuasiveness of
participants’ communications to their chosen advisor will be moderated by the perceived
likelihood that an internal quality review will occur. Specifically, it predicts that an
impending internal quality review will make auditors facing high (low) social costs
communicate a less (more) persuasive message. This prediction, coupled with the main
effect prediction of Hypothesis 5, suggests a disordinal interaction. Visual inspection of
the cell means depicted in Figures 4a, 4b, and 4c, as well as ANCOVA results presented
in Table 3 Panels D, E, and F, confirm the presence of a disordinal interaction for each of
the persuasiveness measures.
When it comes to the total number of facts presented, in situations where there are
lower social costs, the anticipation of an internal quality review increases the number of
significant covariate. Confidence was also included as a covariate in the CONVINCING analysis, as people
that were more confident were marginally more likely to be more persuasive.
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facts provided; whereas, the opposite is true in higher social cost conditions. In higher
social cost conditions, the anticipation of an internal quality review decreases the number
of facts provided. To understand how this relates to the persuasiveness of the message,
the type of facts being provided and the linguistic style or arguments also must be
considered. The measure of the ratio of supporting to non-supporting facts considers the
type of facts that are shared with the advisor. The higher the ratio, the more persuasive
the message is towards the participant's chosen position. The lower the ratio, the more
balanced the set of facts is. Results of the ANCOVA in Table 3 Panel E suggest that
auditors provide a marginally more balanced set of facts when an internal quality review
is highly likely. They also suggest that this is due primarily to participants in the low
social cost condition. While participants in the high social cost condition tend to be
highly persuasive, regardless of the likelihood of an internal quality review, auditors in
the low social cost conditions present significantly more balanced facts when an internal
quality review is highly likely. Consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 6, this
means that the anticipation of an internal quality review promotes more effective
consultations when auditors are in lower social cost conditions; however, it does not
decrease the persuasiveness of auditors in higher social cost conditions.
Further analysis of the types of facts presented (untabulated) suggests that the
number of supporting facts provided is not significantly different across conditions. The
non-supporting facts, on the other hand, differ significantly between conditions. The main
effect of internal quality review is marginally significant (F-statistic = 2.426, p-value =
.061, one-tailed), suggesting that auditors are marginally more likely to provide a higher
percentage of non-supporting facts (compared to total facts) when an internal quality
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review is highly likely, consistent with the prediction that the anticipation of an internal
quality review will promote more effective consultations as a more balanced set of facts
is shared. The interaction of social costs and internal quality review is also significant (Fstatistic = 4.123, p-value = .022, one-tailed), and this is driven by participants in the
lower social cost conditions. Auditors provide the highest percentage of non-supporting
facts (i.e., the most balanced set of facts) when social costs are low and an internal
quality review is highly likely.
Consistent with the analysis of the number and type of facts presented, analysis of
the messages communicated to advisors from a linguistic perspective, as shown in the
ANOVA in Table 3 Panel F, finds a marginally significant interaction (F-statistic =
2.049, p-value = .078, one-tailed). As predicted in Hypothesis 6, the anticipation of an
internal quality review affects auditors differently depending on the level of social costs.
When auditors anticipate that an internal quality review is highly likely to occur, it
increases the degree to which they present a convincing message when social costs are
low, but decreases how convincing the message is when social costs are high.
Thus, I find some support for Hypothesis 6, and conclude that although auditors
communicate more persuasive messages to their advisor when facing high social costs in
an effort to reduce threats to their ego and/or image, the anticipation of an internal quality
review can reduce certain dimensions of persuasion. More specifically, when an internal
quality review is likely to occur, auditors facing low social costs increase the amount of
facts provided to the advisor that are contrary to their chosen position to present a more
balanced set of facts. However, the likelihood of experiencing an internal quality review
does not affect auditors facing higher social costs in the same way; rather, they present
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fewer, and still supportive, facts even when an internal quality review is highly likely.
Although the anticipation of an internal quality review does not prompt auditors facing
higher social costs to present a more balanced set of facts, it does cause them to argue
less persuasively for their chosen position. Thus in all cases, the anticipation of an
internal quality review seems to promote more effective consultations, at least in part. An
implication of these findings is that firms may be able to alter the behavior of auditors
simply by increasing the perception that they will be subject to an internal quality review.
Supplemental Analyses
Perceptions of Internal Quality Reviews
In order to confirm that auditors consciously alter their behaviors when they
believe a review will likely occur, they were asked to respond to three questions about
internal quality reviews in their firm on a 10-point scale anchored at “Strongly Disagree”
and “Strongly Agree.” The questions asked to what extent auditors agreed with the
following statements about internal quality reviews: (1) They likely affect decisions made
on the engagement, (2) They make auditors justify their decisions more thoroughly, and
(3) They increase the importance of the reasonableness and quality of audit judgments.
Consistent with the results of the hypotheses, participants’ responses are above the
midpoint (means of 6.64, 7.16, and 6.94, respectively), suggesting that the auditors agree
that internal quality reviews affect decisions made on the engagement, make auditors
justify their decisions more thoroughly, and increase the importance of the
reasonableness and quality of audit judgments.
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Significant Demographic Variables
As mentioned in the analyses above, the results revealed certain demographic
information is important in determining the likelihood that auditors seek advice and the
likelihood that they will consult the manager on the issue. Gender, the participant’s selfassessed performance ranking relative to their peers, and prior experience going through
a PCAOB inspection are also important in determining the likelihood that auditors will
seek advice. More specifically, males, lower performers, and those that had no prior
PCAOB inspection experience are all less likely to seek help. Of particular interest are
those that consider themselves lower performers. It seems that those most in need of help
may be the ones least likely to seek it out. When it comes to the likelihood of consulting
the manager on the engagement, gender and general audit experience are important
determinants. More specifically, males and less experienced auditors are less likely to
consult the manager and more likely to indicate that they would consult a peer. An
important implication of this result is that less experienced individuals (who presumably
have less expertise) may not be getting the ideal level of instruction.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS
This study investigates important quality control and professional development
features within accounting firms: consultations between auditors and internal quality
review inspections. The results reveal several important findings. The social costs of
seeking advice impact the consulting strategies that auditors employ, which may not
always be in line with AICPA Quality Control standards. This study demonstrates that
despite the importance of the task, auditors’ concerns to protect and defend their
egos/images can cause them to avoid pushing issues up to the manager. It also
demonstrates the ability of firms’ internal quality review processes to mitigate such
behaviors. More specifically, I find that an impending internal quality review will
encourage auditors to overcome the social pressures so that they consult the engagement
manager and give them a more balanced set of facts despite social costs.
This study makes important contributions to accounting literature and to practice.
I attempt to integrate multiple streams of literature and provide a new perspective on the
advice-seeking process. Although existing research focuses on what decision makers do
once advice is received, I propose that advice-seeking behavior is often a proactive
process initiated by the decision-maker. The results provide information regarding who
auditors turn to for advice, when they may or may not do so, and what kind of
information they share when consulting informally. These are important factors to
examine given that typically auditors autonomously choose when to consult, who to
consult, and how to frame the issue they are facing.
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I introduce a framework of auditor social and instrumental motivations and use
this to shed light on factors that may influence the effectiveness of the informal auditor
consultation process. I do this by examining how an auditor’s concern about his or her
ego and image can impact consultation practices. The audit literature has extensively
explored auditor external reputation formation in experimental market settings (e.g.,
Kachelmeier 1991; Mayhew 2001; Mayhew et al. 2001). However, fewer studies have
investigated the individual auditor’s image within the firm and how this affects auditor
behavior (see Sweeney and Pierce 2006 and Stefaniak and Robertson 2010 for interview
information about reporting hours under budget pressure and experimental evidence
about accounting students reporting errors, respectively). I find that auditor’s concerns
about their individual reputations can decrease the likelihood that they will seek help
when it is needed, and even if they choose to seek help, their concerns can drive them to
get help from a less experienced and less senior peer rather than the engagement
manager.
I provide evidence regarding the positive impact of a potential internal quality
review on auditors’ consultation practices. Although these internal inspections have not
received much attention in the accounting literature, the internal quality review process
has become an important mechanism for promoting audit quality and firms expend
considerable resources to perform the reviews. My findings suggest that these reviews
not only help audit firms improve their future audits going forward, but also improve
audit quality on the on-going audits that are subject to such reviews.
This study should also be of interest to practitioners. The findings demonstrate
that the environment created by the audit team matters. Teams should not only encourage
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members to share information and ask questions, but firms should be aware of the
hesitation some may have in seeking advice. These findings should alert superiors to
situations where an auditor may not feel comfortable asking for help. Furthermore, this
may be mitigated, at least in part, when auditors anticipate that an internal quality review
may occur. This finding may be of use to firms as they share information with their
auditors regarding their internal review process (e.g., what the process entails, how
engagements are selected, etc.) as auditors’ behaviors may be shaped by their perceptions
of this process.
Care should be taken in interpreting the results from this study. In addition to the
limitations present in all experimental studies, there are several limitations specific to this
particular study. First, auditors that participated in the study averaged approximately four
years experience. It is reasonable to assume that as auditors gain experience within the
firm, they encounter additional incentives and pressures that may impact advice-seeking
behavior. Second, it is difficult to completely replicate the pressures that exist in practice
in experimental settings. This likely biases against finding results for my hypotheses as
social costs may be stronger and/or more pervasive in the field. Practicing auditors have
been consulted during the development of the experimental instrument to facilitate the
induction of the appropriate pressures. Finally, in practice, auditors may consult with
multiple advisors. Although my design does not allow for them to seek advice from
multiple individuals, it is probable that the outcome of an initial consultation will strongly
influence whether or not additional individuals are consulted. Whether auditors seek
advice from multiple individuals may be a fruitful area for future research to examine.
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TABLE 1 – TESTS OF HYPOTHESES 1 AND 2
Panel A: Mean Likelihood of Seeking Advice
Likelihood of Internal Quality Review
Social Cost
Conditions
Low

Not Likely
Mean =
9.45
Std. dev. =
1.08
n=
23

Highly Likely
Mean =
9.43
Std. dev. =
0.78
n=
25

Row Means
Mean =
9.41
Std. dev. =
0.93
n=
48

High

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

8.58
1.14
23

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

8.92
1.56
23

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

8.78
1.36
46

Column
Means

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

8.98
1.15
46

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

9.22
1.24
48

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

9.10
1.20
94

Panel B: ANCOVA Results
Likelihood of Seeking Advice
df
Internal Quality Review
(IQR)
Social Costs (SC)
IQR * SC
Firm
Gender
Performance rank
PCAOB inspection
experience
Error
Total

MS

F-statistic

p-value

1

0.64

0.53

0.469

1
1
1
1
1
1

11.12
0.72
7.82
4.212
3.38
6.10

9.22
0.60
6.49
3.49
2.80
5.06

0.002
0.221
0.013
0.065
0.098
0.027

86
94

1.21

Panel C: Test of Hypothesis 2
Planned Contrast
The effect of social costs on auditors’
likelihood of seeking advice is smaller
when and internal quality review is
highly likely.

t-statistic
2.415

38

df
36b

p-value
0.011

a

a
a

Likelihood of seeking advice was measured on an 11-point scale anchored at “Very
Unlikely” and “Very Likely.” The variables are defined as follows: Social Costs (SC) are
the social costs associated with seeking advice, and these are manipulated as either high
or low through the description of the engagement environment. Internal quality review
(IQR) represents the perceived likelihood that an internal quality review will occur on the
engagement, and it is manipulated as either highly likely or not likely. Firm represents the
audit firm at which the participant works. Gender represents whether the participant was
male or female. Performance rank represents the participant’s self-assessed performance
ranking relative to their peers. PCAOB inspection experience represents whether or not
the participant has participated in a PCAOB inspection on one of their engagements.
a
b

One-tailed
The test is adjusted for unequal variances.
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TABLE 2 – TESTS OF HYPOTHESES 3 AND 4
Panel A: Mean Likelihood of Consulting with Manager
Likelihood of Internal Quality Review
Social Cost
Conditions

Not Likely
Mean =
9.24
Std. dev. =
2.21
n=
23

Highly Likely
Mean =
10.42
Std. dev. =
0.77
n=
25

Row Means
Mean =
9.98
Std. dev. =
1.70
n=
48

High

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

7.98
3.55
23

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

9.29
2.47
23

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

8.50
3.12
46

Column
Means

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

8.59
3.05
46

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

9.90
1.88
48

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

9.26
2.59
94

Low

Panel B: ANCOVA Results
Likelihood of Consulting with Manager
df
Internal Quality Review (IQR)
Social Costs (SC)
IQR * SC
Likelihood of Seeking Advice
Gender
Total Experience
Error
Total

MS

1
1
1
1
1
1
87
94

35.91
31.28
0.11
22.82
19.87
26.33
5.48

F-statistic
6.56
5.71
0.02
4.17
3.63
4.81

p-value
0.012
0.010
0.445
0.044
0.060
0.031

a
a

Likelihood of consulting the manager was measure on an 11-point scale anchored at “Definitely a peer
who used to be on the engagement” and “Definitely the manager on the engagement.” The variables are
defined as follows: Social Costs (SC) are the social costs associated with seeking advice, and these are
manipulated as either high or low through the description of the engagement environment. Internal quality
review (internal quality review) represents the perceived likelihood that an internal quality review will
occur on the engagement, and it is manipulated as either highly likely or not likely. Likelihood of Seeking
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Advice represents the likelihood that the auditor would seek advice on the issue. Confidence represents
the auditor’s confidence in making the inventory decision presented in the task materials. Gender
represents whether the participant was male or female. Total experience represents the number of months
that the participant has been an auditor.
a

One-tailed
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TABLE 3 – TESTS OF HYPOTHESES 5 AND 6
Panel A: Total Facts
Likelihood of Internal Quality Review
Social Cost
Conditions

Not Likely
Mean =
5.66
Std. dev. =
3.42
n=
29

Highly Likely
Mean =
6.94
Std. dev. =
3.58
n=
31

Row Means
Mean =
6.32
Std. dev. =
3.53
n=
60

High

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

7.43
4.25
28

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

6.50
2.46
30

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

6.95
3.44
58

Column
Means

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

6.53
3.92
57

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

6.72
3.06
61

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

6.63
3.49
118

Highly Likely
Mean =
0.15
Std. dev. =
0.47
n=
31

Row Means
Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

0.26
0.46
59

Low

Panel B: Balance of Facts
Not Likely
Low
Mean =
0.39
Std. dev. =
0.42
n=
28
High

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

0.32
0.38
27

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

0.37
0.37
30

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

0.35
0.37
57

Column
Means

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

0.36
0.40
55

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

0.26
0.43
61

Mean =
Std. dev. =
n=

0.31
0.42
116
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Panel C: How Convincing Communications Were to the Advisor
Not Likely
Highly Likely
Row Means
Mean =
3.24
Mean =
3.82
Mean =
Low
Std. dev. =
2.11
Std. dev. =
2.15
Std. dev. =
n=
29
n=
31
n=

3.54
2.13
60

Mean =

4.63

Mean =

4.05

Mean =

4.32

Std. dev. =
n=

2.75
27

Std. dev. =
n=

1.68
30

Std. dev. =
n=

2.25
57

Mean =

3.91

Mean =

3.93

Mean =

3.92

Std. dev. =

2.52

Std. dev. =

1.92

Std. dev. =

2.22

n=

117

High

Column
Means
n=

56

n=

61

Panel D: ANCOVA Results
Total Facts Communicated to Advisor
df
Internal Quality Review (IQR)
Social Costs (SC)
IQR * SC
Format
Error

1
1
1
1
113
118

Total

MS
0.95
14.13
32.55
73.09
11.50

F-statistic
0.08
1.23
2.83
6.35

p-value
0.774
0.135
0.048
0.013

a

p-value
0.094
0.146
0.035
0.098

a

a

Panel E: ANCOVA Results
Balance of Facts Communicated to Advisor
df
Internal Quality Review (IQR)
Social Costs (SC)
IQR * SC
Confidence
Error

1
1
1
1
111
118

Total

43

MS
0.29
0.19
0.56
0.47
.168

F-statistic
1.75
1.12
3.33
2.79

a

Panel F: ANOVA Results
How Convincing Communications Were to Advisor
df
Internal Quality Review (IQR)
Social Costs (SC)
IQR * SC
Error

1
1
1
112
117

Total

MS
<0.01
19.04
9.83
4.70

F-statistic
<0.01
3.97
2.05

p-value
0.998
0.024
0.078

a
a

The variables are defined as follows: Social Costs (SC) are the social costs associated with seeking advice, and
these are manipulated as either high or low through the description of the engagement environment. Internal
quality review (IQR) represents the perceived likelihood that an internal quality review will occur on the
engagement, and it is manipulated as either highly likely or not likely. Format represents whether the participant
completed the experimental materials online or hardcopy. Confidence represents the auditor’s confidence in
making the inventory decision presented in the task materials.
a

One-tailed
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FIGURE 1 – CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE ADVICE-SEEKING PROCESS*
Motives
•
•

Social
Instrumental

Advice‐Seeking Behavior
Perceived
Cost &Value
of Seeking Advice

Whether to seeka
How to seek
• Sourcea
• Tacticsa
• Timing
• Use of advice
•
•

*Conceptualizations of the feedback-seeking process from recent reviews of the literature shape the overall
framework (e.g., Ashford et al. 2003; Anseel et al. 2007), with the specific types of advice-seeking
behavior in the figure being drawn from the newcomer socialization literature in organizational behavior
(whether and how to seek) (Morrison 2002) and the Judge-Advisor System from psychology (use of
advice) (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006).
a

Decision points currently considered in this study.
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FIGURE 2 – LIKELIHOOD OF SEEKING ADVICE
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FIGURE 3 –LIKELIHOOD OF CONSULTING THE MANAGER
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FIGURE 4A – PERSUASIVENESS OF COMMUNICATIONS – TOTAL NUMBER OF FACTS
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FIGURE 4B – PERSUASIVENESS OF COMMUNICATIONS – BALANCE OF
(NON)SUPPORTING FACTS
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FIGURE 4C – PERSUASIVENESS OF COMMUNICATIONS – HOW PERSUASIVE IS THE
MESSAGE
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